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1. Introduction 
As the international credit crisis related to sub-prime loans has recently 
suggested, some relevant relations exist between credit cycles and fiscal policy over the 
business cycle. The fiscal package launched by President George W. Bush aimed at 
producing a stimulus for the slowing American economy and the $700 trillion bail-out 
plan are vivid examples of such a relation. In fact, in order to contrast a possible 
macroeconomic downturn stemming out from the sub-prime credit crisis the US 
government is providing expansionary fiscal packages. While these are examples of 
anticyclical fiscal policy, a procyclical effect has been envisaged by the Centre for 
Economics and Business Research, which maintains that British taxpayers face up to 5p 
in the pound in extra taxes because of the credit crunch created by the banks.
1 
Thus, one may argue, there is not only a typical relation between fiscal cycles 
and political cycles, as stated by Alesina et alii (2008) with relation to different 
institutional contexts, but a certain relation between fiscal policy and credit cycles could 
be observed as well, whilst this kind of relationship is not considered in the theoretical 
literature on credit cycles (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). This paper will try to explore 
and verify empirically some hypotheses on the relations between credit cycles and fiscal 
policy emerging from the positive observation of the Italian banking system in the long-
run. The key hypothesis is related to previous analysis of the procyclicality of the Italian 
banking system (Brambilla and Piluso, 2007) and long-run fiscal policy (Ricciuti, 
2008).  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 deals with the current literature on 
the procyclicality of the banking and financial sectors; section 3 shows and discusses 
some general trends in the behaviour of the Italian banking system in the long period, 
from 1890 to 1973, and why this could be considered an interesting case for evaluating 
correlations, if any, with fiscal policies all over the business cycle. Section 4 presents 
both data and methodologies here used to verify some key hypotheses on the 
relationship between credit cycles and fiscal policies in the long-run. Results are 
presented in section 5. Finally, some general conclusions will be drawn from this 
specific national experience. 
 
 
1 The Sunday Times, 21
st September 2008.   2
2. Are banking system and fiscal policies procyclical in the long-run? 
The procyclicality of credit in relation with economic dynamics has recently 
gained a certain momentum in the literature as a specific macroeconomic theme as a 
consequence of the increasing interest arising from central bankers and lawmakers for 
its several prudential and regulatory implications (Kaminsky, 1999; Logan, 2000; 
Berger and Udell, 2002; Bliss and Kaufman, 2003). Some authors directly related their 
studies on credit procyclicality to the risk-capital requirements proposed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (Krainer, 2002; Altman et alii, 2005; Goodhart et 
alii, 2004). The topic is apparently related to credit-risk models and to the relative 
efficiency of borrowers screening models over economic fluctuations. It deals with 
defining the best incentives to develop prudential tools (Jimenez and Saurina, 2005), 
while an explicit counter-cyclical hypothesis is less generally considered (Bernanke et 
alii, 1998). The prescriptive goal of these studies is quite explicit. The more or less 
explicit starting point it that ineffectiveness in managing credit risks and boosting risky 
loans in the expansionary phase of the business cycle could damage the economic 
growth in the long-term. In fact, a typical effect of the huge increase in the bank lending 
during the upturn phase is the tendency to the worsening of capital allocation by the 
banking system. In contrast, banks tend to rationing credit even to the best borrowers 
during the downturn phase of the cycle. Thus, it is highly probable that a credit crunch 
occurs with tough effects on investments and, as a consequence, on the pace of the 
economic growth (Demirguç-Kunt and Levine, 2001). 
Even if a growing number of empirical studies on the procyclicality of financial 
and banking systems have been published, it remains rather hard to assess this complex 
phenomenon over the long period. As Benjamin Friedman already stressed twenty years 
ago, it is not simple to generalise findings relating to some specific period (Friedman, 
1988). Indeed, one of the most difficult point to evaluate is the role of the change 
occurred in the main characteristics of business and trade cycles, banking crises, and 
financial regulation. As Barry Eichengreen and Michael Bordo (2001) have more 
recently observed, we can recognise at least four different main periods in the 120 years 
from 1880 onwards: 1880-1913, 1919-1939, 1945-1971, and 1973-1997. These periods 
profoundly differ for the relative intensity and frequency of bank crises, for the nature, 
or the absence, of financial regulation, for diversity of inflation rates and exchange rates   3
regimes, on the financial side; for the variation of the growth rate of productivity and 
output, for relevant distinctions of tendencies in trade cycles, on the real economy side. 
According to Eichengreen and Bordo, up to 1913 the richest countries and developing 
economies experienced a substantially low, even if increasing, inflation and a relative 
stability of exchange rates; frequent and recurrent banking crises were faced by soft 
supervision and regulation. In contrast, the second period was characterised by 
increasing monetary instability and banking crises, critical phenomena followed by the 
emergence of a rather rigid regulation, whilst dramatic economic fluctuations were 
accompanied by a harsh reduction in international trade. In the third period (1945-1971) 
bank lending was seriously constrained by credit controls in the aggregate and, rather 
frequently, forced towards preferred manufacturing and exporting sectors, while 
inflation became more and more rampant and, at the end of the period, exchange rates 
fluctuated and investments were gradually dwarfed by shocks in the oil and raw 
materials supply (Bordo et alii, 2001; Eichengreen and Bordo, 2003). 
Even if this approach is well-founded, it is equally interesting to test the opposite 
hypothesis. That is, are changes really relevant to shape long-term patterns affecting the 
relations between credit cycles and business cycles? Or, differently, is a long-term 
pattern observable in this kind of relationship? If this occurrence was actually 
observable despite the varying of regulatory schemes and macroeconomic contexts, an 
innovative perspective would emerge drawing our attention on a long-run behaviour of 
financial institutions over economic cycles. Thus, such a different perspective could be 
useful to improve the understanding of what procyclicality actually is and how it works. 
Indeed, the current analysis on procyclicality is mostly concerned on relatively short 
and medium term periods. This approach has almost two main effects: first, it is quite 
apparent that significant changes in regulation or in the nature of the business cycles are 
not considered; second, a long-period analysis on distinct individual national cases, 
whose banking system was significantly altered by regulation after a major crisis, may 
offer some innovative perspective on the phenomenon. 
A first attempt to analyse credit fluctuations over business cycles in the long-run 
has recently been done for the Italian case. Business cycles and the banking sector have 
been considered over a quasi-century period (1890-1973), during which major changes 
in the economic structure and one institutional break occurred with major effects on the   4
regulatory scheme. According to its main empirical findings, banking system’s cycles 
appear strongly correlated with business fluctuations, both for size (measured through 
banks’ total assets as a proxy) and activities (credit supply is measured through a loans-
on-liabilities ratio as a proxy), even if the profitability of the banking sector is not 
correlated to business cycles at all (even if measured as a long-term profitability through 
variations of capital requirements, i.e. net worth capital). The smoothing process over 
the cycles emerging after a structural break, more or less in the middle of the time span, 
suggests that some role could be recognised for the large upsurge in public spending as 
an increasing component of the aggregate demand after the Second World War 
(Brambilla and Piluso, 2007).
2 
This is an interesting point that may suggest a new perspective on the complex 
relation between banks and government over the business cycle, as economic literature 
usually tends to relate the procyclicality of the banking system, or financial systems, to 
regulation (Bernauer and Koubi, 2004; White, 2006) or to monetary policy (Toolsema, 
2004). The paper analyses the relations between the banking system fluctuations, on one 
hand, and taxation and public spending dynamics, on the other one, by using a VECM 
methodology. We have found significant correlation between government spending on 
the loans-to-liabilities ratio and on total assets variations for the whole banking system. 
Using the primary surplus, an indicator of expansionary or restrictive fiscal policy and 
government debt as fiscal variables, we find that primary surplus, in contrast with debt, 
has a short-term effect on banking behaviour when the banking system is considered as 
whole. When turning our attention to the relatively small subset of saving banks we find 
that government expenditure has a significantly negative effect on the loans-to-liabilities 
ratio. Instead there are no effects on total assets, whilst taxes have significantly negative 
effects on loans and total assets. Saving banks, therefore, seem more affected by fiscal 
policy than the whole banking system and, in particular, they are negatively affected by 
taxes. These findings are rather consistent with the semi-public nature of this group of 
more prudent financial institutions according to the Italian regulatory scheme prevailing 
over the entire period. Finally, it is rather noteworthy that, according to our estimates, 
 
2 The Italian case has been considered in the short and medium run by other authors relatively recently; 
there are three studies available: Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2003; Quagliariello, 2006; Filosa 2007. Both 
the two latter ones use a VAR approach.   5
both banking and fiscal procyclicality emerged in the long-run, even if some major 
regulatory and political changes occurred. 
 
3. Stylised facts on the Italian banking system and fiscal policy 
  From its very beginning, after the Unification promoted by Piedmont in 1861, 
the Italian banking system experienced several recurrent crises until the adoption of a 
rigid regulatory scheme in the mid-1930s, whilst fiscal policies were rather erratic under 
different political regimes. Banking crises did not cause serious operational restriction 
throughout supervision and regulation until the 1920s. Even if governments and central 
authorities did not intervene directly in regulating banking behaviour for a long time, 
government was repeatedly forced to bail out a number of banks and cooperative banks 
through the indirect support of the main bank of issue, whenever Banca Nazionale nel 
Regno d’Italia re-financed failing banks by obtaining a favourable tax regime on the 
exceeding share of note issuing (Luzzatto, 1968). This practice of bailing out banks in 
troubles had some negative effects on public finances, even if it has been recognised by 
scholars only at a micro level up to now (Pantaleoni, 1895; Confalonieri, 1975). Even 
though a certain relation between banking bail-outs and fiscal policy has been observed 
in some case-studies, there are no quantitative assessments of this phenomenon. Neither 
there is any tentative evaluation of fiscal policies adopted by governments in order to 
stimulate the real economy when some financial failure could negatively affect the pace 
of growth. The smoothing effect emerging on the dynamics of both credit cycles and 
business cycles after the Second World War, just when public spending became an 
increasing relevant share of the aggregate demand and when a tough financial regulation 
was introduced, may suggest that there could be interesting and significant relations 
between them, as we can see in figure 1 (Brambilla and Piluso, 2007). 
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Figure 1. Investments on GDP (left axis) and loans on total assets and on deposits of the Italian 
banking system as a whole (right axis) (1890-1973) 
 
Indeed, investments on GDP series, and its industrial investments’ component, may 
offer some interesting insights into the more sensitive variables to the lending dynamics of the 
Italian banking system as a whole. In fact, these time series present a remarkable change in 
the second half of the 1940s when the Banking Law of 1936 became really effective 
after the autarky and the Second World War. The GDP growth rate in the economic 
miracle period was less volatile as well, with a minor slow in 1964. Both business and 
credit cycles became more stable, most likely because of expansionary fiscal policies 
related to the Keynesian mood then prevailing in Europe and in the USA (Cohn and 
Federico, 2001). A more regulated banking sector and gradually expansionary fiscal 
policies from the early 1950s seem to suggest that there is a certain correlation between 
them, at least in that period of high economic growth, low inflation and increasing 
aggregate demand at least partly drawn by growing public spending and, mostly, 
exports (Delli Gatti et alii, 2005). 
As it has been observed, from the Unification to the European integration of the 
1980s Italian public finance was dominated by a long-run fiscal rule largely accepted 
and pursued by even very differently oriented governments, such as liberal or fascist, or 
post-war centre-left/centre-right democratic coalitions. All over the period governments 
engaged themselves in putting public finance in balance (Ricciuti, 2008). Another view 
on the Italian fiscal history maintains that the fiscal dominance of the monetary policy 
was a long-term feature of the Italian economy, only broken in the early 1980s when the   7
Bank of Italy acquired a substantial independence in setting the monetary policy 
(Spinelli and Fratianni, 2001). Thus, if in the long period fiscal policies appeared to be 
constantly oriented to the balance, banking regulation was significantly revised after a 
remarkable series of crises and failures in the mid-1930s. Nevertheless, procyclicality 
emerges from our estimates: banking variables of the overall size of the sector and of 
the whole offer of credit are correlated to real variables of income and investments
3 
(Brambilla and Piluso, 2007). 
The micro-analysis has shown that banking crises and failures were generally 
faced by recurring to tolerant monetary policy measures. By strongly refinancing banks 
in troubles in order to avoid their failure, the Bank of Italy related its stabilisation policy 
to fiscal dynamics via variations on the taxation regime of the money supply exceeding 
reserve standards (Toniolo, 1978 and 1980; Bonelli, 1991). Thus, major bail-outs 
produced an expansionary fiscal policy with an impact on the public debt. Oddly 
enough, our estimates do not show any significant correlation between banking 
variables and monetary ones. Indeed, it may be argued that the true mechanics depicted 
above it is more like to work when banking variables and fiscal variables are estimated. 
In fact, this is what we can observe, even if there is a certain difference between periods 
about the frequency and the strength of banking crises and bankruptcies. In the first part 
of the period, when universal banks were operating predominantly all the major crises 
occurred (in 1892-93, 1907, 1914, 1921, 1923, 1928, 1932-33) hitting the largest banks 
and either a high number of local banks (Bonelli, 1971 and 1991; Confalonieri, 1974-
1976, 1980-1982, 1994; Toniolo, 1993 and 1995). In these decades governments 
pursued the balance among their most important objectives, even if some exceptions to 
the rule were experienced during periods of war, such as at the eve of the First World 
War. As plotted in Figure 2, the government expenditure over GDP ratio was 
completely out of control only during the two world wars and the autarky in the second 
part of the 1930s, when it peaked up to over 40%. 
 
3 The latter ones are particularly sensitive in the subset of the investments in construction and public 






































































































Figure 2. Government expenditure over GDP ratio, percentage (1890-1973) 
 
It is noteworthy that after the Second World War this variable tended to stay 
over the average of the previous period. Along all the 1950s and 1960s government 
spending over the GDP ratio gained a steady double digit value, a trend initially loomed 
in the late 1920s. The debt over GDP ratio has a different movement over the long 
period. This variable tends to decline sharply when economic growth gained a 
momentum, which is in the first decade of the century and in the 1950s and 1960s. A 
long period of high growth and increasing public spending during the Golden age seems 






























































































Figure 3. Government debt over GDP ratio, percentage (1890-1973) 
   9
Indeed, during the Golden age the Italian banking system did not experience any 
serious banking crisis, except the failure of a semi-public institution, heavily involved in 
a political scandal: the bankruptcy of the Banco di Santo Spirito was silently faced by a 
de facto bail-out in 1963-1964. The subsequent significant crisis occurred only after the 
end of our series, in 1980, when Banco Ambrosiano, involved in a political scandal and 
in a currency turmoil which produced some huge write-offs, failed without any serious 
intervention by central monetary authorities (Bellavite Pellegrini, 2002). 
As fiscal policy is positively correlated with investments, in particular growth in 
public expenditures foster investments, it is easy to suppose that some relations between 
banking behaviour and fiscal policy could be each other related via investments’ cycles.   
 
4. Data, methodology and sources 
We analyse the relationship between fiscal and banking variables. In the latter 
variables include the log of real government spending (LogRealGov), the log of real 
taxes (LogRealTax), and the real primary budget surplus (RealSur). These data are taken 
from Fratianni and Spinelli (2001). Banking data are collected from balance-sheets 
figures from three different databases realised by the Bank of Italy, reclassified to get 
homogeneous data (Cotula et alii, 1996; Banca d’Italia, 1937-1975).
4 As we lack of 
information on interest rates applied to different borrowers (by size, sector, ownership) 
and on non-performing loans we employ rougher indicators as proxies: i) total assets, as 
a proxy of credit supply as a whole in order to evaluate effects of cycles on the size of 
the entire sector; ii) the loans over liabilities ratio is here used to measure the rate of 
intermediation; iii) the liquidity of the system is a proxy aiming to have a control of 
credit crunch. In particular, we consider the behaviour of the whole banking system and 
the behaviour of a subset, Savings & Loans. LogLoanssys and LogLoan_s&l are the 
logs of loans on total liabilities both from the whole system and for Savings & Loans, 
respectively, while Gtotalassetssys and Gtotalassets_s&l refer to the growth of total 
assets of the banking system and of Savings & Loans: finally, LogLiqsys is the overall 
liquidity of the banking system.  For real variables (gross domestic product and 
 
4 The first part of our series is based on Cotula et alii (1890-1936), while the other parts are taken from 
historical statistics publicly provided by the Bank of Italy (1937-1965) and from the Bollettino bimestrale 
every two months by the same institution (1966-1973).   10
investments as a whole) we use historical estimates and series provided by Rossi et alii 
(1993).
5  Realinvgrowth is the growth of real investments.  
  We are interested in the relationship between fiscal and banking variables, 
therefore we first estimate an unrestricted VECM in the following form:    
 
   t p t p t t t u y y y y + Δ Γ + + Δ Γ + Π = Δ + − − − − 1 1 1 1 1 . . .       ( 1 )  
 
where  yt  is a vector of K time series variables,  ) ... ( 1 p K A A I − − − − = Π , 
) ... ( 1 p i i A A + + − = Γ + ,  Ai  being matrices of coefficients (K × K)  and  ut is an 
unobservable error term. The first term of equation (1) includes the short-run parameters 
ed it is stationary, while the second term includes long-run parameters and it is I(1). The 
lag-length is selected according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC, thereafter). 
VECM estimates are then used to detect derive impulse response functions.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Stochastic properties of the series 
The first step of the analysis is the assessment of the stochastic properties of the 
series. We perform this task by using two tests: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) in 
which the null hypothesis is unit root against the alternative of stationarity (Dickey and 
Fuller, 1979), and the KPSS test proposed by Kwiatkowski et alii. (1992) where the null 
hypothesis is stationarity against the alternative of unit root. Ideally, rejection of the null 
in the first test should be confirmed by non rejection of the null in the second (and vice 
versa), leading to a consistent result. 
Table 1 reports the specifications and the results of the two tests. For the ADF 
test the lag-length is determined according to the Akaike Information Criterion, 
searching for up to 10 lags. The time trend is included according to its significance in 
the estimations. The lag-length for the KPSS test is set equal to 2 by default. The trend 




5 There are more updated reconstructions of Italian historical national accounts (Fenoaltea, 2005) but they 
consider only a subset of the time-span we have considered. For homogeneity we decided to use the 
estimates by Rossi et alii (1993).   11
Table 1 – Unit root tests 






Gtotalassetssys 1  Y  -6.5209  0.1058  Stationary 
Gtotalassets_s&l 0  N  -5.8265 0.1049  Stationary 
LogLiqsys 2  Y  -2.8780  0.3456  Non-stationary 
LogLoan_ s&l  1  Y  -3.8681  0.2066  Stationary 
LogLoansys 2  N  -2.4057  0.2035  Non-stationary 
LogRealGov 1  Y  -2.1389  0.4586  Non-stationary 
Realinvgrowth 1  N  -7.1159  0.0821  Stationary 
LogRealTax 1  Y  -2.2747  0.3631  Non-Stationary 
RealSur 1  N  -3.0010  0.1244  Stationary 
For the ADF test with trend critical values are: -3.96, -3.41, -3.13, while for the test without trend are they 
are -3.43, -2.86, and -2.57 at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. For the KPSS test 
critical values for mean stationarity are 0.347, 0.463, 0.739, whereas for trend stationarity they are: 0.119, 
0.146, and 0.216 at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The column trend indicates the 
inclusion (or not) of a trend in the tests.  
 
For all the series but one we got consistent results. For example, in the case of 
Gtotalassetssys, Gtotalassets_s&l, LogLoan_s&l and Realinvgrowth we can reject the 
null of non-stationarity in the ADF test at the 1% significance level, and the KPSS does 
not reject the null of stationarity. For SurGdp, we reject the null of unit root at the 5% 
significance level in the ADF test, and cannot reject stationarity in the KPSS test. 
Therefore, we conclude that these series are I(0). In contrast, for LogRealTax, 
LogRealGov and LogLiqSys we cannot reject the null of unit root, and we do reject the 
null of stationarity in the KPSS test at the 1% level. The same applies to LogLoansys, 
where the null of stationarity is rejected at the 5% level. Therefore, we conclude that 
these series are I(1). 
 
5.2 Cointegration  
 Having  assessed the order of integration of the variables, we need to ascertain the 
order of cointegration of the VECMs we will estimate in order to evaluate prociclicality. 
Table 2 reports the Johansen tests. We can conclude that at the 5% significance level in the 
first two models there is one cointegrating vector, whereas at the same significance level 
there are three cointegrating vectors for the third model, and for the fourth model there are 
three cointegrating vectors at the 1% significance level. 
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Table 2 – Johansen cointegration tests  
r LR p
LogRealGov, LogRealTax, Gtotalassetssys, LogLoansys 
0  82.67   0.0004  
1  45.23   0.0301  
2  13.46   0.7045  
3 2.53    0.9133   
 
LogRealGov, LogRealTax, RealInvgrowth, LogLoansys 
0  116.83   0.0000  
1  43.25   0.0445  
2 19.17    0.2765
3 2.95    0.8715
 
LogRealGov, RealSur, Gtotalassetssys, LogLoansys 
0 201.16    0.0000
1 96.04    0.0000
2 33.22    0.0040
3 12.82    0.0429
 
LRealGov, LRealTax, Gtotalassets_s&l, LogLoan_s&l 
0 368.32    0.0000
1 171.99    0.0000
2 87.55    0.0000
3 33.35    0.0000
Critical values with trend and intercept at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are: for r = 0 60.00, 
63.66 and 70.91; for r = 1 39.73, 42.77, and 48.87; for r = 2 23.32, 25.73, and 30.67; for r = 3 10.68, 
12.45, and 16.22. 
 
5.3 A VECM analysis 
  We analyse the prociclicality between fiscal policy and banking by means of 
impulse response functions generated by the VECM models. If, following a shock in 
banking variables, fiscal aggregates move in the same direction, this is evidence of 
prociclicality. We also look at the other way round, by tracing out the effects of fiscal 
variables on banking. 
Figure 4 considers the VECM between LogRealGov,  LogRealTax, 
Gtotalassetssys and LogLoansys.
6 In these estimations we are interested in the 
interrelation between fiscal policy on the whole banking system. The AIC suggests 
using 8 lags and Table 2 suggests imposing 1 cointegrating vector. Banking variables 
have medium-term effects on fiscal policy, in particular a shock on loans has significant 
effect on government spending and taxes in the medium-run for the growth of assets, 
 
6 For this and the following estimates we have also included a dummy for the two World Wars, but results 
do not substantially change. Results are available upon request.   13
and more lasting for loans. In turn, the two fiscal variables show different effects: 
government spending does not significantly impact on banking activity. In contrast, 
taxes have short-run effects.  
Figure 5 replicates the analysis of Figure 4, substituting the growth of total 
assets with the growth of total investments, a measure of demand for loans from firms. 
In this case the suggested optimal number of lags is 10, and there is one cointegrating 
vector. Growth of real investments positively affects both fiscal variables. In contrast, 
the effect of loans is somehow reduced with respect to Figure 4. Taxes and government 
spending have a very short-lived effect on loans and on the growth of real investments, 
making fiscal policy quite ineffective in promoting economic activity.   
  In Figure 6 we substitute taxes with the primary surplus, an indicator of 
expansionary/restrictive fiscal policy. The number of lag is 11, and Table 2 suggests 
using three cointegrating vectors. Government spending reacts negatively to changes in 
total assets in the short-run, but over the medium run this effect becomes positive. As a 
result, an improvement in the fiscal position is shown in the short-run, but then it 
becomes insignificant. Loans have also a positive effect on government spending, and a 
negligible one on real surplus. Growth of total assets is not affected by fiscal variables, 
whereas government spending has a long-run effect on loans and real surplus a short-
run effect. 
Figure 7 considers the variables LogGovGdp, LogTaxGdp, Gtotalassets_s&l and 
LogLoan_s&l, turning our attention to the subset of Savings & Loans. In this case the 
number of lags suggested by the AIC is 14, and three cointegrating vectors are imposed. 
The effects of shocks in banking variables are quite small in size and tend to be very 
short. Government expenditure and growth of total assets are substitute in the short-run, 
whereas a shock on taxes has a positive and significant impact on banking variables. A 
shock of loans has a medium-run effect on government spending but not on taxes. 
Saving and Loans, therefore, seem less affected by fiscal policy than the whole banking 
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Figure 5 – VECM between government spending, taxes, investments’ growth, and loans 
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Figure 6 – VECM between, government spending, primary surplus, growth of assets and loans. 
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Figure 7 – VECM between government spending, taxes, growth of assets and S&L loans. 
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5.4 Stability 
  In order to check for the stability of the relationships we have analysed before, it 
is appropriate to use the CUSUM statistics. For VECM models with a known number of 
cointegrating vectors, single-equation OLS is efficient and this set of statistics can be 
applied (Lütkepohl, 2004). Figures 8-11 show that for all the equations the statistics 
remain safely within the 5% significance level boundaries, indicating no structural 
breaks during the period, with the exception of Gtotalassets_s&l in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 8. Stability of the VECM between government spending, taxes, growth of assets and 
loans 
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Figure 10. Stability of the VECM between government debt, surplus, growth of assets and loans 
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Figure 11. Stability of the VECM between government spending, taxes, growth of asset and 




We have analysed the relations between the banking system fluctuations, on one 
hand, and taxation and public spending, on the other hand, using a VECM approach. 
We find significant prociclicality of fiscal policy (especially government spending) with 
respect to the banking system. Turning our attention to the subset of Savings & Loans 
we find smaller and less significant prociclicality, probably due to the more 
conservative nature of their banking policy. The relations we have uncovered appear 
stable over time. In a political economy interpretation of these findings, we think that in 
‘good times’, when economic activity flourishes and banks increase their lending, fiscal 
authorities tend to increase their spending instead of saving for future rainy days. 
Indeed, the historical record of the Italian fiscal policy shows an upward trend in 
spending and large deficits and debt that have been reduced in a number of strong fiscal 
consolidations.    21
In this paper we have not estimated a structural version of the VECM model, we 
have taken an exploratory way in absence of an explicit theory linking the variables 
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